

## Perfect Secrecy (A Minor Correction)

This was the definition that I originally forgot to give, then filled in later (correctly, as it turns out).

**Definition 0.1.** Define the *set of possible ciphertexts for a given key  $K$*  as the set given by  $C(K) = \{E_K(M) : M \in \mathcal{M}\}$

Unfortunately, after giving this definition, I changed the definition for  $p(C)$  (the probability of seeing the ciphertext  $C$ ) to something slightly wrong. The corrected definition is this:

$$p(C) = \sum_{\substack{K \\ C \in C(K)}} p(K)p(D_k(C)) .$$

Here,  $p(K)$  is the probability that the key  $K$  is chosen, and  $p(D_k(C))$  is the probability that a message  $M$  (that encrypts to  $C$  under key  $K$ ) is sent. In class, I erroneously introduced a variable  $y$  in place of  $C$ .

Since I have your attention, I may as well give the proof that I skipped.

**Theorem 0.1** (Our two definitions for perfect security are equivalent).

$$p(M | C) = p(M) \iff p(C | M) = p(C) \quad \text{for all } M, C$$

*Proof.* To see this, note the following:

$p(M, C) = p(C, M)$	joint probabilities
$p(M, C) = p(M   C)p(C)$	identity
$p(C, M) = p(M)p(C   M)$	identity
$p(M)p(C   M) = p(M   C)p(C)$	Bayes' Theorem.

( $\implies$ ) If we have perfect secrecy, by definition  $p(M) = p(M | C)$ , so those two terms cancel and we have

$$p(C | M) = p(C)$$

as claimed. The other direction is identical. □